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CRIMINAL LAW IN MISSOURI-1957*
WILLIAm E. GLADDEN**
The cases in the field of criminal law account for a large percentage
of the work of the Supreme Court of JMissouri. In 1957 there were
seventy-three decisions in the appellate courts concerning this field of the
law. The questions which were raised in the cases reviewed often have
been passed upon several times before. There are several new and unique
questions in the cases for the past year which are noted in the following
Article. The treatment of settled principles is also presented as a reminder
and review for attorneys engaged in trying criminal cases.
I. SPECIFIC OFFENSES
A. Homicide
State v. Stidhaml was a prosecution for first degree murder arising
out of the prison riots. The state's case was based on the theory of con-
spiracy and the evidence did not show any direct act of defendent as far
as physical violence to deceased. The court sustained a conviction point-
ing out that mere encouragement is enough with respect to a principal in
the second degree before the fact and that no particular acts are neces-
sary.
Another first degree murder case 2 pointed out that demonstrative
evidence, such as photographs, are admissible if such evidence tends to
connect defendant with the crime, prove the deceased's identity, show the
nature of the wound, or throw any relevant light on a material matter.
Such evidence is admissible under this rule even if it is gruesome.
State v. Malones was a prosecution for murder in which the principal
defense was that the shooting was accidental. The trial court's refusal to
instruct on self-defense was held to be proper since self-defense involves
an intentional act, whereas accidental homicide, as was alleged here, is an
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1957 Missouri court decisions.
**Attorney, Houston, Missouri; A.B., University of Missouri, 1952, LL.B., 1954.
1. 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957).
2. State v. Moore, 303 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
3. 301 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1957).
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unintentional act. In a second degree murder prosecution 4 it was held
that evidence of drinking on the part of the defendant was admissible on
the issue of motive, and it was further pointed out that the presence or
absence of motive was to be given such weight as the jury considers it to
be entitled to.
In a manslaughter prosecution, 5 defendant had come to a home where
the deceased was visiting, had kicked out the storm door, had made
belligerent remarks in the home, and thereafter, in front of the home, the
deceased and the defendant engaged in a fight in which deceased was
killed. It was held that defendant was guilty of manslaughter, even
though the deceased attacked the defendant and it became necessary for
defendant to take the life of the deceased in order to save his own. The
evidence showed that defendant provoked the difficulty which led to the
fight and there was no showing that defendant withdrew or attempted to
withdraw after provoking such difficulty.
State v. Berryj6 presents an interesting question on double jeopardy.
Defendant was prosecuted on a charge of murder and was convicted of
manslaughter. In the original trial the jury was unable to agree and was
discharged and the case was continued to another date later in the same
term. In the next term the prosecuting attorney entered a nolle prosequi
after a venire of prospective jurors had been assembled, sworn, nd
challenged, but the trial jury had not been sworn. In an excellent dis-
cussion on double jeopardy the court stated that these prior proceedings
had not placed defendant in jeopardy.
B. Robbery
State v. Vandament7 was a case of robbery in the first degree in
which it was found that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery.
The defendant went into a tavern while the proprietor was in' the jack
room. He allegedly took money from the cash register and when the
proprietor heard a noise and came to the door of the main roord" of the/!
tavern, the defendant stuck a gun out at the proprietor and then ran out
-of the tavern. It was pointed out that where the defend / obtained
physical possession of the property by stealth, and that force, violence, or
putting in fear was used only for means of escape, or where the evidence
4. State v. Henderson, 301 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1957).
5. State v. Fuller, 302 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. 1957).
6. 298 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1957).
7. 299 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1957).
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failed to show that possession of the property was obtained by force or
violence or putting in fear, then the crime is not robbery.
State v. Tripp8 was a charge of robbery in the first degree on the
theory that defendant was an accessory and could therefore be charged,
tried, and punished in the same manner as a principal in the first degree.
The opinion stated that the distinction between principals and accessories
has been virtually abrogated by statute9 and that an accessory can be
charged even though the principals have not been arrested, tried or
punished.
In a first degree robbery prosecution' ° where an assault with intent
to rape occurred immediately following the robbery, testimony concern-
ing the assault was admissible as part of the res gestae and as an act
which was inseparable from the robbery.
In State v. Loral' it was held that the defense of insanity and the
defense of an alibi are not conflicting and the defendant may rely on both
and introduce evidence as to both in a robbery prosecution.
C. Burglary and Stealing
In State v. Zammer12 the court stated that it is only in first degree
burglary indictments and not in second degree burglary indictments that
the method of gaining entry by forcibly bursting or breaking must be
alleged. The opinion further sets out an excellent dicussion on the
requirements for the indictment or information in a burglary and steal-
ing (larceny) case. It was indicated that pleading under consolidated
stealing statutes, such as we now have in Missouri, was intended to be
simplified, and that such consolidated statutes tended to eliminate con-
fusion in the prosecution for any type of wrongful acquisition of property
of another.
State v. Ewing'3 was a case in which the evidence indicated an entry
of a service station but there was no evidence of a breaking upon entering.
There was evidence of a later escape by breaking. It was held that there
was no burglary where there was no evidence that entry was made by
force.
8. 303 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1957).
9. § 556.170, RSMo 1949.
10. State v. White, 301 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1957).
11. 305 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957).
12. 305 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1957).
13. 298 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1957).
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Burglary tools taken from the trunk of a vehicle by officers when
they arrested defendant are admissible in a burglary prosecution. 14 In
the same case it was pointed out that malicious destruction of property
was not a lessor offense of the charge of burglary and therefore there
was no need for the trial court to instruct on such an offense.
In a burglary prosecution, evidence that when the defendant was
discovered in a service station, he left the service station and ran, was
admissible to shqw consciousness of guilt and to show flight.15
D. Rape
In a statutory rape prosecution, penetration may be shown by
circumstantial evidence and slight proof of actual penetration is suf-
ficient.16 Generally a prima facie case can be made in a statutory rape
prosecution on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix unless
such testimony is contradictory with physical facts and common experi-
ence, so as to be unconvincing.17 In this type of case evidence of similar
acts committed by defendant with prosecutrix prior to the date charged
in the information is admissible.' 8
Where a defendant was charged in two counts of an information 9
with assault with intent to rape and molestation of a minor, and the two
counts involved occurrences at one time and place and with reference to
defendant's conduct toward the same child, then the state was not
required to elect, prior to the close of its case, whether to proceed on the
charge of assault with intent to rape or the charge of molestation of a
minor.
E. Driving Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated
State v. Powell2" is a novel case in that the defendant was convicted
of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated where the evidence showed
that at the time of the offense he was driving a farm tractor.
F. Forgery
In a forgery prosecution, evidence of the utterance by defendant of
another check on the same day he uttered the check mentioned in the
14. State v. Drake, 298 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1957).
15. State v. Peterson, 305 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1957).
16. State v. Ivey, 303 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1957).
17. State v. Palmer, 306 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1957).
18. State v. Tyler, 306 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957).
19. State v. King, 303 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. 1957).
20. 306 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1957).
1958]
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss4/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
information was admissible to prove defendant attempted to defraud in
the utterance of the check described in the information.21 Also in a
forgery prosecution, proof of prior taking of checks and check protecting
machine was admissible even though such acts might have constituted
another criminal offense. Such facts were held admissible as being
relevant circumstances that would tend to establish the elements of the
crime charged. 22
G. Misdemeanors
Defendant was prosecuted on a charge of disturbing-the-peace after
he had been involved in an altercation with a city marshall. After an
acquittal on the disturbing-the-peace charge, defendant was then charged
with common assault and convicted. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held
that even though the disturbing-the-peace charge and common-assault
charge grew out of the same transaction, proof essential for the common-
assault charge would not necessarily convict defendant of disturbing the
peace. Therefore prior acquittal on disturbing the peace did not bar
prosecution for common assault.23
- In a charge against parents for violation of compulsory school attend-
ance law, it is necessary that the information negative the provision of
the statute relating to home instruction.24
State v. La Driere25 was a proceeding in prohibition to prevent a
circuit judge from assuming jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment
entered in the magistrate court upon a plea of guilty by defendant to a
misdemeanor charge. It was held that defendant had no right of appeal
from a judgment entered in the magistrate court upon a plea of guilty.
This is contrary to an earlier case decided by the St. Louis Court of
Appeals.28
H. Confidence Game
State v. Webster27 was a prosecution for a violation of the confidence
game statute.28 The defendant tricked prospective tenants into signing a
lease agreement for an apartment owned by defendant and paying rent
21. State v. Garrison, 305 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1957).
22. State v. De Poortere, 303 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1957).
23. State v. Brooks, 298 S.W.2d 511 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
24. State v. Cheney, 305 S.W.2d 892 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957).
25. 299 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
26. State v. Akers, 287 S.W.2d 370- (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
27/K298 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1957).
--28. § 561.450, RSMo 1949.
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in advance, when in fact defendant had no intention of abiding by the
contract, and defendant then obtained cancallation of the lease by
demanding additional payment for alternations. The court held that there
was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under this statute and
they further held that evidence of prior acts of the defendant was
admissible to show the same thing had happened previously with other
tenants. The court also indicated that in a prosecution under this statute
the state can use evidence of future promises and performances since this
statute is considered broader than that of obtaining money by false
pretenses. 29
I. Habitual Criminal Act
State v. Thompson0° was a prosecution for first degree robbery under
the Habitual Criminal Act. The defendant contended that there should
be no evidence allowed of three prior convictions inasmuch as the same
three prior convictions had been previously used against him in another
prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Act. The court did not decide
this question directly since the jury made no findings as to prior convic-
tions. The court stated that the charge of prior convictions is not made as
an independent charge of the commission of those offenses but merely
as affecting punishment. By way of dicta, it was indicated that in the
opinion in the earlier case of State v. Collins,31 there seems to be a rather
clear inference that the use of a prior conviction more than once is pre-
missible. Several cases3 2 indicate what is necessary proof under the
Habitual Criminal Act and these cases repeat the established rule that
the identity of names is prima facie sufficient to establish defendant's




In a second degree murder prosecution it was prejudicial error for
the trial court to deny the defendant the right to use a transcript of testi-
mony of the first trial of the defendant to impeach testimony of a witness
29. § 561.370, RSMo 1949.
30. 299 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1957).
31. 266 Mo. 93, 180 S.W. 866 (1915).
32. State v. Reed, 298 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1957); State v. Garrison, 305 S.W.2d 447
(Mo. 1957); State v. Peterson, 305 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1957).
1958]
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss4/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
for the state in the instant trial. 33 Previously it had been held that the
state could impeach testimony of the defendant at a second trial by use of
testimony at the first trial,34 and the court indicated they could conceive
no reason why the rule should be different for a defendant who desires to
impeach a witness for the state. In this same murder prosecution the
defendant contended she had shot her husband in self-defense, and the
trial court was found to be in error when it refused to permit defendant
to present evidence of prior threats and acts of violence on the part of the
deceased.
State v. Kollenborn 35 involved a charge of mistreatment of an infant
in which the wife of the defendant and mother of the infant testified
voluntarily against her husband. In a very interesting opinion the court
found that the wife was a competent witness against her husband in a
prosecution for acts of personal violence against her child. This extends
the exception to the common law rule on testimony of one spouse against
another. The court states that such an exception is desirable since it
involves an offense against marital status, against public policy, and that
there is a true necessity that the wife be permitted to testify in event of
personal injury to her child, and that the exception which applies to
personal injury to herself should equally apply in a case involving
personal injury to her child. The opinion cautioned that this rule was not
to be taken as controlling in civil cases.
B. Confessions and Admissions
State v. Chernick,36 a first degree robbery case, indicated that the
fact the defendant was under arrest at the time his statement was made
and that his counsel representing him was not then present, would not
render his statement involuntary as a matter of law.
State v. Scott,3s another robbery prosecution, held that an admission
made by defendant after defendant had been held more than twenty
hours and no charge had been filed against him, would not alone, establish
such admission as being made involuntarily.
33. State v. Laspy, 298 S.W2d 357 (Mo. 1957).
34. State v. Meyers, 189 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. 1945).
35. 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
36. 303 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1957).
37. 298 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1957).
[Vol. 23
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C. Instructions
In a first degree murder case where the state had offered in evidence
a voluntary statement of the defendant,38 it was held that an instruction
concerning the voluntary statement of defendant was erroneous. The
instruction directed that what was said against defendant in the volun-
tary statement, the law presumed to be true. The instruction further
directed that what was said in the voluntary statement that was favor-
able to defendant, the jury might believe or disbelieve, as may be shown
to be true or false by the evidence. The court held that whether there are
both favorable and unfavorable statements, or just unfavorable, such as
instruction that gives a presumption is erroneous as being a comment on
the evidence and actually goes beyond a comment on the evidence and
amounts to a direction that the jury accept presumed facts to be true.
This opinion would seem to settle the rule on such instructions, whether
they involve just unfavorable statements or whether they involve favor-
able and unfavorable statements concerning the defendant.
D. Argument of Counsel
It would seem that there are always many questions raised as to the
propriety of the arguments of state's counsel in criminal cases. As is
indicated by the following discussion, there can be no set rule applied as
to what can be argued and what cannot be argued, but the propriety of
each argument must be determined on the facts of the particular case.
State v. Spencers9 contained an excellent discussion of the duties of the
prosecuting attorney in representing the state in a criminal case and the
bounds beyond which the attorney for the state should not go. This case
involved a charge of assault with intent to kill. The prosecutor, in his
cross-examination of defendant's character witness, made inquiry as to
whether the witness realized that defendant's father had been disbarred
from the practice of law. The court, in no uncertain terms, indicated that
such cross-examination was highly improper and that the trial court com-
mitted error in not reprimanding counsel upon request of defendant's
attorney. In a further example of stressing the bounds of propriety, the
prosecutor, in his oral argument, indicated that defendant was a promi-
nent man from a prominent family and called the jury's attention to
newspaper articles. The prosecutor further argued that the defendant
38. State v. Phillips, 299 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957).
39. 307 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1957).
19581
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could hire a good attorney who would browbeat witnesses. All of these
remarks were held to be highly improper and prejudicial to defendant.
In State v. Hite40 prosecutor, in his closing argument, made the fol-
lowing comments with regard to the defendant's side of the case: "And
what's on his side of the scale-empty?" "When the State closed the
evidence what did the defendant offer? They offered no evidence at all."
It was held by the court that these remarks did not refer to the accused's
failure to testify.
In a prosecution for murder, the prosecutor in his final argument
called the defendant an adulterer. Such a remark was found to be
objectionable because there was no evidence in the record that the
defendant was guilty of adultery, as that crime is defined in the statute.
41
State v. Daegele42 involved a charge of molesting a female child. In
the opening statement the prosecuting attorney indicated that three
witnesses identified pictures of the defendant as taken from police files.
The court found that such a comment was improper, but did not con-
stitute grounds for discharge of the jury, in view of the fact that the trial
court heard the comment, considered its probable effect, and determined
it was not prejudicial.
E. Trial Procedure
In a case involving molesting a female child,43 it was held that it was
not prejudicial error for the trial court to permit the prosecutrix to be
present in the courtroom when not testifying and in permitting her
parents to be present during her testimony, as such matters are in the
discretion of the trial court.
In a first degree robbery prosecution," a witness for defendant was
cross-examined as to marital and extramarital relations of witness'
mother. Such an examination was held to be improper and prejudicial
since the credibility of a witness for truthfulness may not be impeached
by showing that his general moral character is bad.
Edwards v. Nash 45 was a habeas corpus action against the warden of
40. 298 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1957).
41. State v. Baber, 297 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1956).
42. 302 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1957).
43. State v. Daegele, supra note 42.
44. State v. Lora, 305 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957).
45. 303 S.W2d 211 (Mo. 1957).
(Vol. 23
9
Gladden: Gladden: Criminal Law in Missouri--1957
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
CRIMINAL LAW IN MISSOURI
the state penitentiary on the basis that the accused had been convicted in
a capital case without the appointment of counsel on his behalf. It was
pointed out in the opinion that a state's policy in regard to the appoint-
ment of counsel in capital cases has no effect with regard to due process
as required by the federal constitution. The court further pointed out
that the accused in a capital case must be appointed counsel whether or
not counsel is requested by accused. Such is held to be necessary by the
United States Supreme Court 46 to satisfy the due process clause in the
fourteenth amendment.
In an application for continuance in a criminal case, the trial court is
not limited to consideration of facts stated in the affidavit of defendant,
and the trial court may inquire into the truth of the statements contained
in the application, either by hearing evidence or by applying its own
knowledge of what has occurred in the case at the time application is
made, especially where the court is led to question the good faith of the
accused.4
F. Appeal /
In at least half of the cases involving the field of criminal law which
were reviewed by the Missouri supreme court during the year 1957, the
court has refused to review allegations of error contained in the motion
for new trial on the grounds that the allegations were too indefinite and
did not comply with supreme court rule 27.20.48 An assignment of error
must set forth in detail and with particularity the specific grounds or
causes for a new trial.4 9
There is no question from the cases reviewed that the supreme court
requires that their rules as to appeal be followed. However, any doubt
as to whether defendant's motion for a new trial sufficiently preserves for
appellate review the question of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict, will be resolved in defendant's favor.50 The court also
demands that the motion for new trial be filed within the allowed time
and has held that such a motion filed after the allowed time has elapsed is
a nullity and preserves nothing for review. 51
46. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
47. State v. Le Beau, 306 S.W2d 482 (Mo. 1957).
48. RSMo 1957 Supp., at 1376.
49. State v. Reed, 298 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1957); State v. White, 301 S.W.2d 827
(Mo. 1957).
50. State v. Westberg, 307 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1957).
51 State v. Kenton, 298 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1957).
1958]
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G. Writs of Error Coram Nobis and Motions to Vacate
Sentence and Judgment
During the past year there were several interesting cases which were
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis. These writs were ordinarily
brought to attack a judgment of conviction after the sentence had been
served. The purpose of these writs generally was to attempt to invalidate
previous convictions, so that the petitioner would not be liable for
prosecution at the present time under the Habitual Criminal Act. The
court generally held in these cases that such a writ is available to attack
a judgment of conviction even after sentence has been served, provided
that the motion is for a cause specified in the supreme court rules which
provide for procedure for attack upon judgments. It has been held that
habeas corpus would not be applicable in such cases because the attack
was not on any sentence under which the petitioner was then in custody.52
The opinions of the court involving such writs indicate that the trial court
can speak only through its records and that a judgment cannot be im-
peached by oral testimony.53
In an attack upon a judgment for the reason that it did not show
defendant waived his right to counsel, the court held that since there was
not a positive showing defendant had not waived his right to counsel, the
proceedings in the trial court would be presumed to be correct, and the
failure to show the waiver of the right to counsel would not in itself
invalidate a judgment against the defendant."4
In another hearing on a writ of error coram nobis, the court indicated
that its review was based on the record as made in the lower court, as in
suits of an equitable nature, and that such a proceeding was not a trial de
novo, in that it was not a complete retrial in which new proofs might be
made and the whole case opened up."5
In a motion to vacate a sentence and judgment the court held that
any variance between the warrant, affidavit and complaint, with respect
to the nature of the offense, did not affect the question of defendant's guilt
or innocence, and if the warrant was defective such defect was waived
by failure to make timely objections and by proceeding with the trial. 8
52. State v. Stodulski, 298 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1957).
53. Ibid.; State v. Harrison, 299 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1957).
54. State v. Stodulski, supra note 52.
55. State v. Eaton, 302 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1957).
56. State v. Ninemires, 306 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1957).
[Vol. 23
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In another such motion brought under supreme court rule 27.2657 the
court indicated that such a motion may not be used as a substitute for a
motion for new trial nor shall it function as an appeal,5 and even though
there was an admission of evidence by the trial court that could have
been considered prejudicial on appeal, had it been properly raised and
preserved, where the defendant did not raise the issue and his appeal was
dismissed such an erroneous admission of evidence was not grounds for a
collateral attack on the judgment.
57. RSMo 1957 Supp., at 1377.
58. State v. Hagedorn, 305 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1957).
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